Baba Kamma 13a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 💬 Guemara let Ravina answer Rava’s objection by saying: This baraita, which states that an offering of lesser sanctity is the prop…

let Ravina answer Rava’s objection by saying: This baraita, which states that an offering of lesser sanctity is the property of its owner and may be sold even when the Temple stands, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and it is referring to a case where the animal is still alive. And that qualification of the mishna by Rav Naḥman, that the sale of an unblemished firstborn animal when the Temple is standing is invalid, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion. The Gemara answers: He said to him that this is not difficult: Do you speak of gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, of which a firstborn animal is an example? Gifts of the priesthood are different from other offerings of lesser sanctity, as when the priests receive their portions, they receive them from the table of the Most High. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili claims that the act of consecration of an animal as an offering of lesser sanctity does not nullify one’s ownership of the animal. The sanctity of a firstborn offering takes effect with its birth, so it may be that it was never owned; rather, it is reasonable that the Torah provided the priest only with the right and the obligation to partake of it after it is sacrificed. § The Gemara considers the matter itself: The baraita teaches: Concerning one who steals another’s property and takes a false oath denying he has done so, incurring the obligation to bring a guilt-offering, the verse states: “And commits a trespass against the Lord, and deals falsely with his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The verse serves to include a case in which one denies having in his possession offerings of lesser sanctity, which are the property of their owners, and are included in the phrase “and deals falsely with his neighbor.” This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Master said in the baraita: Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. The Gemara asks: Ben Azzai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to peace-offerings, is to exclude what? If we say it is to exclude a firstborn offering, because he holds that a firstborn is not the property of the priest, one could reject this, as the sanctity of a firstborn offering is a lesser sanctity than that of a peace-offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to peace-offerings, which have a higher degree of sanctity such that they require placing hands on the head of the offering and are accompanied by libations and the waving of their breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together, you nevertheless say that it is the property of the owners, is it necessary to state that with regard to a firstborn offering, for which these halakhot do not apply, that the priest has ownership of it? Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Azzai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering, i.e., every tenth animal of one’s flock that is designated as tithe for those ten animals and is sacrificed as an offering of lesser sanctity. Animal tithes are excluded because ben Azzai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock. This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it. Ravina taught the preceding discussion with regard to the last clause of the baraita: Abba Yosei ben Dostai says that ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara asks: Abba Yosei ben Dostai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to a firstborn offering, is to exclude what? If we say it is to exclude peace-offerings, because he holds that they are not the property of the one who consecrated them as offerings, one could reject this, as the sanctity of peace-offerings is a lesser sanctity than that of a firstborn offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to a firstborn offering, which is already sanctified upon its emergence from the womb yet nevertheless is the property of the priest, is it necessary to state that peace-offerings are the property of those who consecrated them, where the animals were already the property of its owner before they were consecrated? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Abba Yosei ben Dostai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering. Animal tithes are excluded because Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock. This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it. The Gemara asks: How can one claim that Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that peace-offerings are also owned by those who consecrated them? Doesn’t Abba Yosei ben Dostai say: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult. § The Gemara cites an alternative explanation of the mishna’s statement: Rava said: What does the mishna mean when it says: One is liable only for damage caused to property for which, were one to use it for a mundane purpose, one would not be liable for the misuse of consecrated property? It is referring to property that is not at all subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property, and what is that? It is referring to any property of an ordinary person, which has no sanctity at all. The Gemara asks: But then let the mishna teach explicitly: One is liable only for damage caused to property of an ordinary individual. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult. § Rabbi Abba says: With regard to the case of an innocuous animal that was consecrated as a peace-offering and that caused damage, the injured party collects damages from its meat, i.e., from the portion of the offering that would have been eaten by its owners. This is in accordance with the general halakha that the payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is collected exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the ox and not from any other property of its owner. But he does not collect the damages from the sacrificial portions. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that one collects exclusively from the meat portion and not from the sacrificial portions, as those are to be offered up to God? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that there is no collection from the owner’s meat portions corresponding to the sacrificial portions. Payment for damage caused by an innocuous animal is half the amount of the damages, and can be no more than the value of the animal itself. Rabbi Abba is teaching that when assessing the damage to determine the amount to be paid, one deems the owner responsible only according to his share of the animal, i.e., the meat portions, in relation to the animal as a whole. Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis engage in a dispute concerning the halakha in a case in which an ox pushed another animal into a pit (see 53a). If it were an innocuous ox, for which the Torah limits the owner’s liability to half the damages, the Rabbis rule that liability is incurred exclusively by the owner of the ox, i.e., he pays half the value of the damage, and the owner of the pit is entirely exempt. Rabbi Natan holds that since the damage was caused jointly by the ox and the pit, the owner of the ox need pay only half of what he would pay if his animal had been solely responsible, i.e., a quarter of the damages. Rabbi Natan further rules that the remaining sum can then be fully recovered from the owner of the pit, i.e., he pays the remaining three-quarters of the damages. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion, of those tanna’im, does Rabbi Abba state his ruling? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then it is obvious and there is no need to state it, as didn’t the Rabbis say: Whenever, for whatever reason, the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this party, it is not recovered from that party, i.e., even though the injured party suffered the loss of the full value of his animal and recovered only half its value from the owner of the ox, he may not demand the remaining sum from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, where the injured party cannot collect damages from the sacrificial portions, he cannot recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, doesn’t he say: Whenever the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this one, it is recovered from that one, i.e., since the owner of the ox pays only a quarter of the damages, the remaining sum can be recovered from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, since the injured party cannot collect payment from the sacrificial portions, he should be able to recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering, in contrast to the ruling of Rabbi Abba. The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan, and if you wish, say his ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis. The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis, as one might have thought that this matter, the ruling of the Rabbis, applies only where the damage is caused by two bodies, such as an ox and a pit. But where the damage is caused by one body, as in the case of damage caused by an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, the injured party can say to the owner of the animal: From anywhere that I want to, I will recover my losses, and accordingly, the injured party could collect the full cost of the damage from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that this is not the halakha. And if you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan: It is only there that the owner of the damaged ox can say to the owner of the pit: Since I found my ox in your pit, ultimately you bear responsibility for any damage, and therefore whatever I cannot recover from the other one, i.e., the owner of the ox, I will recover from you.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français que Ravina réponde à l’objection de Rava en disant : Cette baraita, qui stipule qu’une offrande de moindre sainteté est …

que Ravina réponde à l’objection de Rava en disant : Cette baraita, qui stipule qu’une offrande de moindre sainteté est la propriété de son propriétaire et peut être vendue même lorsque le Temple est debout, est conforme à l’opinion de Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, et elle se réfère à un cas où l’animal est encore vivant. Et cette qualification de la mishna par Rav Naḥman, selon laquelle la vente d’un premier-né sans défaut lorsque le Temple est debout est invalide, est conforme à l’opinion de les Rabbis, qui contestent l’opinion de Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. La Guemara répond : Il lui dit que cela n’est pas difficile : Parles-tu des dons auxquels les membres du sacerdoce ont droit, dont un animal premier-né est un exemple ? Les dons du sacerdoce sont différents des autres offrandes de moindre sainteté, car lorsque les prêtres reçoivent leurs portions, ils les reçoivent de la table du Très-Haut. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili prétend que l’acte de consécration d’un animal comme offrande de moindre sainteté n’annule pas la propriété de l’animal par son propriétaire. La sainteté d’une offrande premier-née prend effet à sa naissance, il se peut donc qu’elle n’ait jamais été possédée ; plutôt, il est raisonnable que la Torah ait donné au prêtre seulement le droit et l’obligation d’en consommer après qu’elle est sacrifiée. § La Guemara considère la question elle-même : La baraita enseigne : Concernant celui qui vole la propriété d’autrui et fait un faux serment niant l’avoir fait, encourant l’obligation d’apporter une offrande de culpabilité, le verset dit : « Et commet un sacrilège contre l’Éternel, et agit avec fausseté envers son prochain » (Lévitique 5:21). Le verset sert à inclure un cas où l’on nie avoir en sa possession des offrandes de moindre sainteté, qui sont la propriété de leurs propriétaires, et sont incluses dans la phrase « et agit avec fausseté envers son prochain ». C’est la déclaration de Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Ben Azzai dit : Cette phrase sert à inclure les offrandes de paix. Abba Yosei ben Dostai dit : Ben Azzai n’a dit cela qu’à propos d’un premier-né offrande. Le Maître a dit dans la baraita : Ben Azzai dit : Cette phrase sert à inclure les offrandes de paix. La Guemara demande : L’interprétation de Ben Azzai de la phrase, limitant son interprétation à une référence uniquement aux offrandes de paix, est-elle pour exclure quoi ? Si nous disons que c’est pour exclure un premier-né offrande, parce qu’il tient qu’un premier-né n’est pas la propriété du prêtre, on pourrait rejeter cela, car la sainteté d’une offrande premier-née est une moindre sainteté que celle d’une offrande de paix, comme suit : Or, de même que concernant les offrandes de paix, qui ont un degré de sainteté plus élevé tel qu’elles exigent l’imposition des mains sur la tête de l’offrande et sont accompagnées de libations et de l’agitation de leur poitrine et de la jambe arrière droite par le prêtre et le propriétaire ensemble, tu néanmoins dis que c’est la propriété des propriétaires, est-il nécessaire de déclarer qu’en ce qui concerne un premier-né offrande, pour laquelle ces halakhot ne s’appliquent pas, que le prêtre en a la propriété ? Plutôt, Rabbi Yoḥanan dit : Ben Azzai a mentionné les offrandes de paix afin d’exclure une offrande de dîme animale, c’est-à-dire chaque dixième animal de son troupeau qui est désigné comme dîme pour ces dix animaux et est sacrifié comme offrande de moindre sainteté. Les dîmes animales sont exclues parce que ben Azzai tient qu’une offrande de dîme animale n’est pas la propriété du propriétaire du troupeau. C’est comme il est enseigné dans une baraita : En ce qui concerne une offrande premier-née, il est dit : « Tu ne rachèteras point » (Nombres 18:17), indiquant que le propriétaire ne peut jamais pleinement racheter l’offrande, retirant ainsi sa sainteté. Et l’offrande premier-née peut être vendue lorsqu’elle est sans défaut et vivante, ou lorsqu’elle est avec un défaut et vivante, ou avec un défaut et abattue. En ce qui concerne les offrandes de dîme animale, il est dit : « Elle ne sera point rachetée » (Lévitique 27:33), indiquant que celui qui l’a désignée ne peut jamais pleinement racheter une offrande de dîme animale, retirant ainsi sa sainteté. Et l’offrande de dîme animale ne peut pas être vendue, ni lorsqu’elle est vivante ni lorsqu’elle est abattue, ni lorsqu’elle est sans défaut ni lorsqu’elle est avec un défaut. Le fait que la vente d’une offrande de dîme animale soit invalide démontre qu’elle n’est pas la propriété de celui qui l’a désignée. Ravina a enseigné la discussion précédente en ce qui concerne la dernière clause de la baraita : Abba Yosei ben Dostai dit que ben Azzai n’a dit cela qu’à propos d’un premier-né offrande. La Guemara demande : L’interprétation d’Abba Yosei ben Dostai de la phrase, limitant son interprétation à une référence uniquement à une offrande premier-née, est-elle pour exclure quoi ? Si nous disons que c’est pour exclure les offrandes de paix, parce qu’il tient qu’elles ne sont pas la propriété de celui qui les a consacrées comme offrandes, on pourrait rejeter cela, car la sainteté des offrandes de paix est une moindre sainteté que celle d’une offrande premier-née, comme suit : Or, de même que concernant une offrande premier-née, qui est déjà sanctifiée dès sa sortie du ventre et pourtant est la propriété de le prêtre, est-il nécessaire de déclarer que les offrandes de paix sont la propriété de ceux qui les ont consacrées, où les animaux étaient déjà la propriété de leur propriétaire avant d’être consacrés ? Rabbi Yoḥanan dit : Abba Yosei ben Dostai a mentionné les offrandes de paix afin d’exclure une offrande de dîme animale. Les dîmes animales sont exclues parce qu’Abba Yosei ben Dostai tient qu’une offrande de dîme animale n’est pas la propriété de [...]

📜 Baba Kamma — 13a

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